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THE IDEA OF AUSTERITY IN BRITISH POLITICS, 
2003–13 
ABSTRACT 
Employing a dataset of 1,843 think tank publications containing 37 million words, Computer-assisted 
Text Analysis (CATA) was used to examine the idea of austerity in British politics between 2003 and 
2013. Theoretically, the article builds on the ideational turn in political research. However, in contrast 
to much ideational work which argues that ideas are important at times of crisis because they can 
address uncertainty, this article argues that moments of crisis can lead to the reformulation of ideas. 
Empirically, this article demonstrates the transformation of the idea of austerity. Prior to the 2008 
financial crisis, austerity was largely understood either in historical terms or as a practice applied in 
other countries. In the aftermath of the crisis, both the political right and left attempted to co-opt the 
idea of austerity for their own ends, combining it with various other ideational strands on which they 
have historically drawn.  
It was David Cameron, then leader of the Conservative opposition, who argued that the UK was 
entering an ‘age of austerity’ following the 2007/08 financial crisis (Cameron, 2009). In the years 
since, British political debate seems to have become polarized between a pro-austerity right and an 
anti-austerity left, with senior figures in the Labour Party arguing that the Conservative austerity 
programme was ineffective and harming the most disadvantaged in society (Darling, 2011, p. 309). 
This polarization seemingly culminated in 2015, when new Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn defined his 
party as ‘anti-austerity’ (Corbyn, 2015). Polarization is rarely this neat, however. The aim of this article 
is to better understand the idea of austerity in British politics, how it rose to prominence, how it is 
used across the political spectrum, and how it relates to other ideas. 
While ideas have long played a role in the study of politics, especially for those employing historical 
methods (such as Barker, 1978; Freeden, 1978), recent years have seen growing prominence for 
various analytical approaches that overtly try to use ideas as a counterpoint to more positivist 
traditions. This development has gone under several names, including the ideational turn (Blyth, 
1997), discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008), interpretivism (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, chapter 2) 
and constructivism (Hay, 2006), as well as the study of paradigms (Hall, 1993), discourses (Hajer, 
1993; Schmidt, 2001), narratives (Bacon, 2012; Boswell, 2013; Miskimmon et al., 2014), agenda 
setting (Kingdon, 2014), and framing (Fischer, 2003; Boin et al., 2009). These approaches share the 
view that ideas matter for understanding political phenomena. Building on this body of work, this 
study examines the evolution of the idea of austerity, drawing on a dataset of think tank publications 
from 2003 to 2013. This dataset offers a powerful tool for understanding the evolving ideational 
landscape. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, a theoretical section examines the claim that ideas matter in 
political life and why this approach has proved to be particularly useful for the research of financial 
crises. Second, the data and methods section discusses the value and limitations of think tank 
publications as a resource for ideational research, as well as describing the Computer-assisted Text 
Analysis (CATA) procedure. The empirical section follows. Finally, a short conclusion examines the 
empirical and theoretical ramifications of this article’s findings. 
THEORIZING THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN POLITICAL LIFE 
A full review of the arguments made in the now extensive range of ideational literature is beyond the 
scope of this article (for the best article-length summary, see Schmidt, 2008). However, to 
operationalize the ideational approach of this study, it is worth making a few observations about the 
arguments made in contemporary ideational literature. 
There are broadly two answers to the question of why ideas matter, differentiated by whether they 
are treated as being causational or constitutive (Gofas and Hay, 2010, pp. 4-6). The causational mode 
treats ideas as being explanatory variables, as traditionally understood. However, this approach is 
problematic, as it can lead to ideas being used as explanatory bridging devices, employed only when 
other approaches to analysis fail (Blyth, 2002, p. 17). Also, the causational approach has important 
definitional implications for what constitutes an idea, necessitating that they are discrete and clearly 
identifiable. These difficulties have led to the alternative constitutive approach, wherein ‘ideas 
provide the discursive conditions of possibility of a social or political event, behaviour or effect’ (Gofas 
and Hay, 2010, p. 4). 
A constitutive approach recognizes that ideas can be employed in different ways by different types of 
political actors to communicate with different audiences at different times. One important distinction 
is between ideas that are technical, offering policy prescriptions, and those that are normative 
expressions of values (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). These types of ideas are not wholly discrete, however. 
While more technical discussions may largely be the preserve of policy-makers, public opinion 
research suggests that elite opinion can also have an impact on the wider public (Zaller, 1992, pp. 13-
22; Art, 2005, ebook location 340–67). 
There is also a growing recognition that ideas are unstable (Carstensen, 2011, pp. 597–602). Kingdon 
(2014, chapter 6) talks about the ideational ‘primeval soup’ from which policy emerges, through a 
continual process of recombination. Bevir and Rhodes, writing in the interpretivist tradition, argue 
that ideas evolve in response to changes in the political world. Significantly, they also argue that an 
idea cannot exist in isolation, but instead is constructed through its interrelationship with other ideas. 
New ideas need to be integrated into existing ideational frameworks, but this is only possible when 
they are thematically consistent with that framework (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, pp. 32 and 37; see also 
Bevir, 1999, pp. 213–18). Indeed, it is this malleability that makes ideas so important to political life, 
as they can bind together coalitions of actors with a range of different interests (Béland and Cox, 
2015, pp. 429–32).  
The trend towards ideational analysis is especially evident in discussions of economic crises. Research 
has examined both historic events (Hall, 1989; Hay, 1996; Blyth, 2002) and the contemporary Great 
Recession (Blyth, 2013; Schmidt, 2014). That ideas have played a significant role in the analysis of 
such events is hardly surprising, for two reasons. First, by undermining existing policy paradigms, 
crises generate uncertainty among policy-makers, opening a space for new ideas (Walsh, 2000, pp. 
486–7; Blyth, 2002, pp. 8–10). Second – and because of uncertainty – crises inevitably generate 
ideational contestation about causes and responses (Hay, 1996, pp. 254–6). The 2008 financial crisis 
provides an example of this, being subject to several interpretations. Burnham (2011, p. 501), for 
example, argues that popular understanding of the crisis has metamorphosed through three stages, 
from a crisis in the banking sector, to a sovereign debt crisis caused by government-funded bank bail 
outs, and finally, to a crisis of excessive general government expenditure.  
The debate surrounding austerity offers a particularly good example of some of the tendencies 
predicted in the ideational literature. First, austerity is both a technical and normative idea. At the 
technical level, austerity is the subject of debate among economists. Austere fiscal regimes have been 
justified in a number of ways: that too much public sector spending can ‘crowd out’ the private sector 
and, as a result, cutting public spending can lead to private investment ‘crowding in’ (for a discussion 
of the idea of crowding out, see Carlson and Spencer, 1975, pp. 3–4; see also Giavazzi and Pagano, 
1990, pp. 105–6); that high levels of government debt leads to ‘debt intolerance’ greatly increasing a 
government’s borrowing costs (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, p. 23); and that high government spending 
is the product of political pressures and undermines the outcome that would be generated by an 
efficient market, necessitating cuts to restore equilibrium (Buchanan and Tutlock, 1962, pp. 269–80). 
Other economists have rejected this analysis. While they might disagree on the precise prescriptions 
they recommend, neo-Keynesian economists are united in arguing that curtailing government 
spending in a downturn undermines economic demand (for the clearest post-financial crisis 
articulation of this view, see Krugman, 2012, especially pp. 211–16.). The data used by pro-austerity 
economists have also been attacked. Ireland in the 1980s, for example, is often used as a pro-
austerity case study. However, this claim has been countered by arguing that the late 1980s Irish 
growth was driven by European Union (EU) membership rather than decreased government debt 
(Kinsella, 2012, pp. 233–4). Others have claimed that the case for austerity is built on a 
misunderstanding of the post-financial crisis fiscal situation, where high levels of debt were caused by 
the cost of bailing out the banking sector rather than excessive government expenditure (Blyth, 2013, 
pp. 44–7).  
Beyond these economic arguments, austerity has a second life as a normative concept. For some, it is 
part of a broader ideological project, a ‘regressive redistribution of the costs and risks of economic 
stagnation, deregulatory failure and financial overreach’ (Peck, 2014, p. 19). Such readings see 
austerity as part of an ongoing neoliberal project (for more on the claimed ideological underpinning 
of austerity, see Cahill, 2011; Crouch, 2011). Austerity also has overtones of moral virtue, going back 
to Adam Smith’s advocacy of financial parsimony (Blyth, 2013, pp. 109–11). Some commentators 
have found echoes of this in the ‘moralizing, even sanctimonious register’ used to discuss cuts in 
government spending (Hay, 2010, p. 395; see also Finlayson, 2010, pp. 24–7). 
However, it is important to note that the history of the idea of austerity in the UK demonstrates 
mutation crossing different partisan and ideological traditions. Prior to 2008, austerity was most 
closely associated with the Labour governments of 1945 to 1951 and the country’s economic 
difficulties following the Second World War (Kynaston, 2007, pp. 103–8). In the interwar years, too, 
periods marked by government spending cuts saw complex partisan alliances and divisions forming. In 
1921, the Committee on National Expenditure (the so-called ‘Geddes’s Axe’) was created by David 
Lloyd-George in response to electoral success achieved by a new political party, the Anti-Waste 
League. While the League itself was largely a creation of the Tory press, broader anti-waste rhetoric 
was employed by both Liberals and the Labour Party in this period, so spanned the political spectrum 
(McDonald, 1989, pp. 646–7). Later, during the Great Depression, the Labour government elected in 
1929 split over whether to enact the recommendations of the May Report of 1931. These included 
large cuts in government spending to control the deficit. This split ultimately led to the expulsion of 
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald from Labour, and then a MacDonald-led Conservative-dominated 
national government imposing significant cuts in government spending (Williamson, 2003, pp. 267–
73).  
The preceding discussion suggests several research questions for better understanding the evolution 
of the idea of austerity, how it relates to other ideas, and how different interpretations of the idea 
reflect and shape both political division and alliance: 
 What are the temporal dimensions of discussion about austerity? Answering this will give an 
insight into the prominence of the idea of austerity both before and after the financial crisis 
among left and right-leaning think tanks.  
 Is there a thematic difference between the political left and political right in their discussion of 
austerity? How much is the seeming polarization around austerity reflected in different 
language used about the term? This will give an insight into how the left and right define 
austerity and respond to it.  
 Are different understandings of austerity evident within political factions? As noted above, in 
times of crisis, ideas can play a role in forging coalitions. Addressing this question will offer 
some insights into how coalitions have coalesced around the concept of austerity, as well as 
some of the tensions that might exist.  
DATA AND METHODS 
This articles draws on a large dataset of publications produced by UK think tanks. There are several 
reasons why think tank publications can provide a useful data resource for understanding political 
ideas. First, Hayek famously described the intellectual community, which now includes think tanks, as 
‘second-hand dealers in ideas’ (Cockett, 1995, p. 123). They do not undertake original research, but 
instead draw on a range of ideas created in other fields such as politics, academia and the media. 
While this might be construed as a criticism, it also casts think tanks as conduits through which 
political ideas from various sections of society flow. Characterizing their role in this way clearly adds 
value to studying their outputs. Second, and indicative of the link between think tanks and other fields 
of political activity, is the much commented-on movement of personnel between think tanks, party 
politics and government. The New Labour period saw several senior figures moving between think 
tanks, appointed government positions, the House of Commons and ministerial posts (Schlesinger, 
2009, pp. 7–11). While not always looked upon favourably by those studying the area, this 
development undoubtedly shows the link between the think tank sector and political decision-
makers. Finally, and echoing ideational theory, it has been argued that think tanks have the potential 
to be most significant at moments of crisis, when policy-makers are more likely to look for external 
solutions (Bentham, 2006, pp. 168–70; Pautz, 2013, pp. 369, 372). As such, the financial crisis of 2008 
has created a potential window of opportunity for think tanks, making their outputs even more 
worthy of study. 
It is also worth noting some of the limitations with using think tanks as a data resource, and how 
these might be responded to. First, it is possible to overstate the role of think tanks. Think tanks 
themselves are keen to claim that they have a high level of influence (see, for example, Adam Smith 
Institute, 1990). Some academic accounts also give them a significant role either in government 
(Hennessy, 1989, pp. 221–2; Schlesinger, 2009) or in major ideological changes in party politics (Desai, 
1994; Cockett, 1995). However, it is very hard to measure any direct impact (Weidenbaum, 2010, p. 
134), leading some to doubt the influence of think tanks (James, 1993, p. 514). That said, we cannot 
dismiss the role played by think tanks. Instead, it has been argued, we should look to understand their 
broader role in shaping the ideational climate in which politics takes place (Stone, 1996, pp. 684–5).  
Second, think tanks can be criticized for being both socially and ideologically narrow. In some ways, 
this is the corollary to arguments about think tanks being embedded in the wider political system – 
they are of the political elite. It is certainly the case that think tanks tend to employ people from a 
relatively narrow range of universities (Ball and Exley, 2010, p. 161). Inevitably, any ideational study 
drawing on data created by a particular type of organization should be treated with care, as there 
may be different ideas in circulation in other political spaces. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that 
recent research has suggested that ideas from social movements and more radical political groups 
can circulate widely and cross over into more mainstream political discourse (Bennett and Segerberg, 
2013, pp. 186–91). 
GATHERING THE DATASET AND CODING THE SAMPLE 
[Table 1: Complete dataset of UK think tank publications gathered for this study] 
Addressing the research questions posed in this article requires studying think tanks with identifiable 
political orientations. This is more complex than it would first appear. Weaver (1989, pp. 564–8) sub-
divides think tanks into three distinct types: ‘universities without students’, with a strongly academic 
ethos; contract-based research consultancies; and advocacy tanks that work to articulate an 
ideological or partisan worldview. As is often the case, such neat typologies become less useful in the 
real world, where think tanks engage in a variety of work that cannot be neatly compartmentalized. 
Twelve think tanks that were primarily known for their advocacy work were contacted directly with a 
request to access their publication archive. At this point, two think thanks were excluded because 
their archives where not organized or complete enough to generate a sizable sample over an 
extended period. The ten remaining think tanks suggested accessing their public archives available on 
their websites. While some think tanks had public archives stretching back to the 1990s, 2003 was 
chosen as the starting point for the study because, for many of the think tanks, this was when their 
archives became more complete. This start point also ensured a significant portion of the data pre-
dated the financial crisis, a requirement of the research questions. This approach generated a 
collection of 1,843 publications published between 2003 and 2013, totalling nearly 37 million words 
(referred to as ‘the dataset’ throughout this article; the contents of the dataset are shown in Table 1). 
This is clearly not a perfect sampling strategy – think tanks, for example, might be able to edit their 
public publication list, omitting items that turn out to be inaccurate or politically embarrassing in the 
light of later events. Nevertheless, the size of the dataset and the method employed offset this risk to 
some extent. The CATA approach (detailed below) focuses on patterns of language use over time. 
Even if individual publications are unavailable, those patterns should remain evident. 
The next step was to code the think tanks as being on the left or right. In some cases, this was 
relatively simple. The Fabian Society is an affiliate organization of the Labour Party, for instance 
(Fabian Society, 2014). Some cases are more ambiguous. Demos, for example, became closely 
associated with New Labour in the 1990s. At different times, the organization has positioned itself as 
either above partisan politics or as working across partisan boundaries (Bale, 1996, p.29; Demos, 
2009). These complexities, however, do not preclude identifiable right and left-wing traditions 
existing in British politics, and these traditions provide, in the adjective employed by Barker, a 
‘serviceable’ (1978, p. 2) way to categorize think tanks. This acknowledgement of broad political 
traditions is reflected in the language employed in the coding, borrowed from Baker et al.’s (2013, p. 
8) study of representations of Muslims in the UK press where newspapers were categorized as being 
right- or left-leaning. Additionally, the idea of a tradition is useful in allowing for different types of 
think tanks to co-exist on the left and right, because it can encompass organizations with very 
different approaches, methods and goals. Some think tanks are more technocratic and some more 
normative, for example, but they can still be considered part of the same tradition (indeed, this latter 
distinction becomes particularly evident in the answer to research question three, below). 
From the dataset, every paragraph referencing ‘austerity’ was extracted (creating ‘the sample’). This 
approach generated 650 gobbets of texts, totalling 63,210 words. The decision to sample in this way 
has important ramifications for the types of claims that can be made based on its analysis. One 
limitation is the exclusion of discussions of austerity-type policies that do not feature the word 
‘austerity’. While this should certainly be acknowledged, the sample gathered does still provide an 
extensive window into both left- and right-leaning think tanks (481 and 169 items respectively) that 
will allow for the discussion of austerity to be situated in relation to other concepts. 
Finally, the sample was coded using the variables needed to address the research questions. These 
included the publishing think tank and year of publication. 
METHODS FOR ANALYSIS 
These data were then analysed using a variety of CATA techniques, employing the software package 
T-Lab (2014; see also Lancia, 2012, for a discussion of the tool’s capabilities). CATA refers to a family 
of methods wedding statistical analysis of texts with interpretative techniques (for overviews, see 
Kelle and Bird, 1995; Popping, 2000). These methods sit at the junction between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, making them ideal tools for ideational research, partially because the study of 
ideas lends itself to methodological pluralism (Bevir and Rhodes, 2005, p. 178), but also because such 
research has been accused of failing to match theoretical advances with similar empirical 
developments (Kangas et al., 2014, p. 74). 
To address the first research question (What are the temporal dimensions of discussion about 
austerity?), the relative frequency of the word ‘austerity’ through the dataset is calculated, and then 
compared between left- and right-leaning think tanks. To address the second research question (Is 
there a thematic difference between the political left and political right in their discussion of 
austerity?), a corpus analysis compared the language used in the sample with a subset of the sample. 
Subsets were created by combining two variables – the political leaning of the think tank responsible 
for publication, and the year of publication. A chi-square test was used to test for significance and to 
rank words that appear most disproportionately in the subset, relative to their appearance in the 
overall sample (see Baron et al., 2009, pp. 3–4 for a discussion of the history of the use of chi-square 
tests in corpus linguistic analysis; for a broader overview of the method, see Baker, 2006). The third 
research question (Are different understandings of austerity evident within political factions?) employs 
a correspondence analysis. This multivariate method converts a matrix of data (in this case, the 
appearance of a word and variables across the 650 gobbets of text mentioning austerity) into a 
graphical form, with the first axis (normally represented as the x-axis) showing the maximum possible 
proportion of association (often referred to in correspondence analysis as ‘inertia’), and the second 
axis showing the maximum remaining level of association that can be displayed, and so on 
(Schonhardt-Bailey, 2008, p. 403).1 In practice this means that words and variables with ‘similar 
distributions will be represented as points that are close in space, and categories that have very 
dissimilar distributions will be positioned far apart’ (Clausen, 1998, p. 2). (Clausen, 1998, provides a 
relatively non-technical introduction to correspondence analysis. For a more detailed discussion of 
the method, see Greenacre, 2010. For examples of the use of correspondence analysis in political 
science, see Schonhardt-Bailey, 2005, 2008.) It is important to note that the axes have no pre-defined 
significance (and as such, are labelled as x and y in figures). The challenge for researchers is to 
understand the meaning of the axes using existing theory. This interpretative element is the great 
strength of correspondence analysis, as it has the power to reveal the underlying structure of the 
data.  
It should be noted that these methods are not wholly automated. Keyword in Context Tools (KWIC) 
allows the researcher to examine interesting patterns more closely. This type of deep reading of the 
text is important especially because T-Lab lemmatizes words. This means that inflected forms of a 
word are grouped together. While this is generally useful for analysis, it can create potentially 
confusing results (see endnote 4 for an example). The overall analytical procedure used in this study is 
summarized in Table 2. 
[Table 2: Analytical procedure employed in this study] 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Figure 1 shows the number of mentions of austerity in the dataset per year. Unsurprisingly, austerity 
becomes a far more common point of discussion after the financial crisis, with the number of 
mentions increasing every year. It is notable that this increase is predominantly driven by left-leaning 
think tanks. Evidence for this trend is provided in Figure 2, which shows the number of mentions of 
austerity per 100,000 words in the dataset, sub-divided by left- and right-leaning think tanks. Only in 
2010, the year of a general election, did references to austerity come close to parity (1.595 mentions 
per 100k words on the left, 1.209 on the right). This might suggest that, at that point in our sample 
period at least, discussion of austerity was seen to serve some useful purposes for the political right, 
particularly to claim that the incumbent Labour government had engaged in excessive spending. In 
contrast, in the years after the election, discussion of austerity on the political left increases much 
more rapidly.  
[Figure 1: Overall number of mentions of austerity by left- and right-leaning think tanks, 2003–13] 
[Figure 2: Mentions of austerity per 100k words published by left- and right-leaning think tanks, 2003–
13] 
It should also be noted that discussion of austerity is not absent from the period prior to 2008 – there 
were 23 references between the beginning of 2003 and the end of 2008. Contrasting this with the 
post-financial crisis pattern, it is interesting to note that right-leaning think tanks were marginally 
more likely to use the term in the earlier period. Most often, it was linked to specific historic 
situations such as the post-1945 Labour government: 
Both during and after the Second World War, the left brilliantly espoused a political economy 
of austerity and sacrifice in a centralised war-time state. (Reid, 2005, p. 67) 
Far less common are characterizations of austerity as a right-wing ideological disposition. In the whole 
period analysed before the financial crisis, this only happens once:  
The central pillars of neo-liberalism – market liberalisation, privatisation, budgetary austerity 
– are only useful if they translate into equitable and sustained economic growth. How each of 
these policies, and other aspects of liberalisation, are managed in practice determines overall 
growth and poverty outcomes. (Cooksey, 2004, p. 51) 
This quote is hardly a full-throated defence of neoliberal austerity. It focuses on international 
development rather than the UK economy. Furthermore, the argument is for restraint: while austerity 
is a ‘central pillar’ of neoliberalism, precisely how it is deployed is hugely important to successful 
policy outcomes. 
This first stage of the analysis points towards an evolution of the idea of austerity. Before the financial 
crisis, the term is used by both left- and right-leaning think tanks. Furthermore, it is employed in 
diverse ways. In contrast, following the financial crisis – and despite the concept of the ‘age of 
austerity’ coming from David Cameron – austerity appears to have become a greater pre-occupation 
among left-leaning think tanks, that are far more likely to use the term than their right-leaning 
counterparts. This is especially true after the formation of the Cameron-led coalition government in 
2010. This is a significant development, suggesting that the term was re-introduced to the British 
political lexicon by the right, but was, in only a few years, co-opted by the political left, with an 
attempt being made to repurpose it as a critique.2 
The next stage of the analysis, employing a corpus linguistic analysis, provides further evidence of the 
left’s attempt to employ austerity as a term of critique. The results are shown in Table 3.  
[Table 3: Corpus analysis of right- and left-leaning think tanks, 2003–13] 
Left-leaning think tanks often discuss austerity through the prism of electoral politics (both ‘Labour’ 
and ‘party’ feature in their most typical post-financial crisis words). This is not entirely unexpected. In 
the years after the financial crisis, Labour was either an embattled government preparing for an 
election or in opposition. Similarly, left-leaning think tanks reflect the values and concerns of the 
broader political left (‘social’ in the post-crisis period, ‘health’, ‘inequality’ and ‘welfare’ in 2013, and 
‘disable’ in 2010). Also evident are efforts by left-leaning think tanks to define their ideas against the 
concept of austerity (for example, ‘investment’, ‘change’ and ‘alternative’ in the overall post-crisis 
period), suggesting an attempt to develop a distinctive response to the financial situation and 
austerity. For example:  
There is now a considerable danger that productive social investment strategies will be 
significantly reduced under conditions of austerity. There is compelling evidence that shifting 
expenditures towards “growth-orientated policies” … will help to build up long-term human 
capital and innovative capacity. (Diamond and Lodge, 2013, p. 13) 
[P]olitics is about choices and Labour would itself need to provide a credible alternative that 
was not simply its own version of a “Plan B” for the economy. (Beer, 2011, p. 17) 
This analysis leads to two observations about discussions of austerity on the political left. First, it 
involves a distinctive definition of crisis. Among left-leaning think tanks, rather than being a debt 
crisis, or even a global financial crisis, it seems that austerity and its consequences are increasingly 
seen as a crisis in its own right. Second (and particularly evident in the quotes above), is a belief that 
the financial crisis and austerity policies have created an opportunity for a fundamental shift in values. 
Right-leaning think tanks have also developed their own vocabulary for discussing austerity. 
Predictably, debt features highly (in the post-crisis period), while other economic terms are also 
evident (‘GDP’ in 2012, ‘wage’ and ‘employer’ in 2010). These words are used to construct an 
argument in favour of curtailing national debt. For example:  
Going forward, if the government acknowledges its true debt level, it will have to behave as 
any highly indebted person, institution or government does. (Silver, 2010, p. 17) 
The ratio of public sector net debt to GDP is projected to continue to rise, to 69% of GDP in 
2015–16. Thereafter, the austerity measures agreed to 2017 could eliminate the national 
debt by around 2050. (Johnson, 2012, p. 3) 
These arguments essentially reiterate David Cameron’s original statement (2009) about austerity, 
especially the claim that the levels of government spending that developed under the pre-2010 
Labour administration were unsustainable and needed to be curtailed. 
This is not the whole story, however. Discussions about austerity on the political right reveal a cocktail 
of concerns. Words linked to Europe are very prominent (‘German’, ‘Germany’, ‘Greek’ and 
‘European’ in the post-crisis period). It might be assumed, given the right’s pre-occupation with 
national debt, that such terms were used to argue for debt aversion, but this is not the case. The 
Greeks’ situation is treated with some sympathy, portrayed as a product of the flawed European 
project and German dominance. For example:  
Greek complaints about the tone and the severity of the German Diktat, which envisioned tax 
rises, deep cuts in public spending and selling of national assets as a price for financial aid, 
were dismissed out of hand by Berlin…. German leaders remain adamant about the fulfilment 
of the austerity measures. (Harris-Quinney and Scholer, 2011, p. 14) 
[T]he austerity of Thatcherite economics counted for nothing compared to the dogmatism 
and blinkered ideology of the EU. (Oborne and Weaver, 2011, p. 63)  
Sympathy with the economic plight of Greece does not necessarily suggest that right-leaning think 
tanks are opposed to austerity measures in the UK, but it does indicate that discussion of austerity is 
far from monolithic. In this case, economic arguments in favour of austerity are trumped by the 
right’s pre-occupation with the EU. While anyone familiar with recent British political history and the 
Conservative Party’s divisions about the EU will not be surprised (for a detailed account of these 
conflicts, see Bale, 2010), it undermines the idea that the right-leaning think tanks have a 
fundamental and unbending belief in an austerity agenda to the exclusion of other issues. 
A third strand of discussion among right-leaning think tanks concerns the traditional conservative 
desire to preserve societal stability at times of economic crisis. ‘Stability’ is one of the distinctive 
words in the right-leaning think tank sample post-crisis (as is ‘police’; ‘crime’ also appears in 2013). 
This reflects a different and recurring strand of conservative thought, fearful of the disorder that 
might be created by economic dislocation. For example: 
“Doing more with less” has become a mantra for senior police leaders as they seek to reform 
their police forces as part of a broader response to reduced public sector spending. (Innes, 
2013, p. 12) 
After one of the warmest summers on record, and austerity tightening its hold on the police, 
partners and people’s pockets, we are faced with the very real prospect that crime may be on 
the rise again. (Mulligan, 2013, p. 24) 
The linking of the economic doctrine of austerity with a desire for a strong state should be no 
surprise. Scholarship on Thatcherite conservatism in the 1980s noted that, while wedded to free 
market ideology, it retained a desire to preserve the coercive power of the state (Hall, 1983, pp. 36–9; 
Gamble, 1988, pp. 31–7, 54–61). Recent commentary on the coalition government’s austerity policies 
argues that it also draws on concerns about law and order at times of economic crisis (Clarke and 
Newman, 2012, pp. 12–13). 
The corpus analysis offers some insights into ideas that are fuelling the debate about austerity. 
Correspondence analysis will point towards how these constellations of ideas relate to each other, 
forging coalitions and creating divisions.  
[Figure 3: Correspondence analysis of left-leaning think tanks] 
The correspondence analysis of the left-leaning think tanks (shown in Figure 3) suggests three clusters 
of language use. Along the x-axis (association = 38.81%3), it is possible to identify two distinct clusters. 
On the upper left of the diagram are words that are party political (for example, ‘Miliband’, ‘Osborne’, 
‘Labour’, ‘Tory’, ‘Party’ and ‘coalition’) or which relate to relatively broad ‘state of the nation’ 
economic discussions (‘debt’, ‘economy’, ‘GDP’, ‘growth’ and ‘spending’). It is notable that the think 
tanks clustered in this area are, in various ways, the most interested in progressive political strategy 
(Compass, the Fabians and Progress). The cluster to the right of the x-axis is different, reflecting a 
much clearer anti-austerity agenda. Not only does it focus on the more traditional concerns of the 
political left (‘benefit’, ‘health’, ‘inequality’, ‘NHS’ and ‘welfare’), but it also references more direct 
forms of action (‘protests’, and some examples of ‘demo’ and ‘march’4). Two things are notable about 
the use of these words. First, they seem to be in particular proximity to discussions about disability, 
reflecting a critique that austerity policies have most harshly affected people with disabilities, 
especially the phasing out of the Disability Living Allowance from 2013 (O’Hara, 2014, ebook location 
3236–315). Second, it is worth noting how far removed these discussions are from more mainstream 
talk about electoral politics. The y-axis (association = 28%) suggests a third cluster of discussion 
among left-leaning think tanks that is more technocratic, focusing on formal economics (‘analysis’, 
‘capitalism’, ‘institutional’, ‘investor’ and ‘policy-maker’). It is noticeable that the IPPR (Institute for 
Public Policy Research), arguably the most important left-leaning think tank in the UK, sits in this 
technocratic cluster. 
This analysis points towards two intriguing speculations. First, it is notable how discussions of party 
political strategy (upper left cluster) are far removed from either values-based concerns (right cluster) 
or technocratic policy development (bottom cluster). This suggests that neither the left’s critique of 
austerity nor its policy development process was closely wedded with political strategy, possibly 
pointing to some of the weaknesses in the Labour Party’s 2015 election campaign (Cowley and 
Kavanagh, 2015, ebook location 1881–2478). Second, the estrangement between mainstream 
political rhetoric, values and more direct forms of political action could be interpreted as a pre-cursor 
to the rise of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader and the re-invention of the Labour Party on an anti-
austerity platform following the 2015 election.  
[Figure 4: Correspondence analysis of right-leaning think tanks] 
Right-leaning think tanks’ language also appears to divide into three clusters (shown in Figure 4). 
While four of the think tanks sit at roughly the same point on the x-axis (association = 36.53%5), the 
Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) is far removed. This reflects the CSJ’s distinctive agenda, focused on 
social exclusion and poverty (highlighted in the appearance of words such as ‘breakdown’, 
‘dependency’, ‘poverty’, ‘social’ and ‘society’ near the CSJ). Another interesting facet of this cluster is 
verb use, with the notable appearance of very active and combative words (‘challenge’, ‘confront’, 
‘secure’ and ‘tackle’). This cluster of words therefore seems to reflect a much more interventionist 
strand of conservative thought, less enamoured with outcomes created by the free market (Dorey, 
2011, pp. 11–14). 
The y-axis (association = 25.14%) moves from language related to applied policy questions at the top 
of the axis (‘police’, ‘reduction’, ‘school’, ‘service’ and ‘value’) to more formal macro-economic 
analysis and economic management issues at the bottom of the axis (‘fiscal’, ‘framework’, ‘monetary’ 
and ‘stimulus’). The former group is clustered around the Policy Exchange (labelled as PolEx), an 
organization claimed to be David Cameron’s favourite think tank (Bright, 2006). It is also associated 
with words relating to reforming public services (‘efficiency’ and ‘local’). In contrast, the latter group 
is more closely associated with the Institute of Economic Affairs, the think tank most associated with 
Thatcherism (Denham and Garnett, 1998, pp. 3–5). It is also notable that words relating to Europe 
appear in this cluster (‘ECB’, ‘EMU’, ‘EU’, ‘European’ and ‘German’). None of the three clusters is in 
any way incompatible with the pursuit of austerity policies. Nor, however, are they inherently aligned 
with each other, suggesting the possibility of tensions on the political right. Arguably, such tensions 
were evident in the resignation of Iain Duncan-Smith, Secretary of State for Works and Pension and 
founder of the CSJ, from the Cabinet in March 2016 (on the claimed grounds of objecting to 
continuing government spending cuts), and in Conservative divisions during and after the referendum 
on the UK’s EU membership in June 2016. These events could be understand as part of a process 
where different ideas are peeled away from the austerity project. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments made in this article have ramifications for ideational theory. Crisis, and the role that 
ideas play at such moments, have been of interest to researchers. This is because crisis events 
provide the opportunity for ideational contestation and for new ideas to fill the vacuum left by pre-
crisis policies that are deemed to have failed. Conversely, however, it is also important to examine the 
impact that a crisis can have on ideas. Austerity provides an example of this process, which occurred 
in three stages. Prior to 2008, austerity was largely discussed as either from the past or something 
that happened in other countries (especially economically less developed countries). In the second 
stage, the political right attempted to co-opt the idea of austerity, to attack the Labour government. 
Finally, the political left attempted to redefine the economic crisis as caused by austerity, to critique 
the coalition government. 
Both positions were syntheses of various ideational strands on the right and left. While the post-
financial crisis debate about austerity in the UK may seemingly be polarized between a pro-austerity 
right and an anti-austerity left, the analysis in this article suggests there is scope for a more nuanced 
reading, as neither the left nor the right is homogenous in its use of the term. The language of right-
leaning think tanks does not just focus on national debt or the size of the state, but also on more 
long-standing ideological concerns, such as law and order, and the EU. On the left, too, divisions are 
evident between discussions about party and electoral politics, a more values-based approach 
focused on traditional concerns, and a more technocratic tendency.  
This article has examined how ideas are used by different political actors over time, and how the idea 
of austerity is related to other ideas. What it has not done is addressed how ideas co-exist with other 
objects of political analysis. One question raised by ideational research is how ideas relate to the 
material world (Schmidt, 2008, p. 318). For example, in the context of the topic addressed by this 
article, the extent to which the UK has practised austerity policies has been questioned, with it being 
argued that any serious attempt to cut state spending ceased in 2012 in response to government 
unpopularity (Clarke et al., 2015, pp. 43–4). This does not mean we can write off the idea of austerity 
as irrelevant, however. Indeed, ideas like austerity may be more powerful precisely because they exist 
as rhetoric and not as precisely defined policy prescriptions (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013, ebook 
location 769–806). This might explain why discussion and disagreement about austerity has been so 
virulent since the financial crisis, and why alternative ideational paradigms have failed to make a 
significant breakthrough, despite the clear evidence presented in this article that at least some left-
leaning think tanks believed there was an opportunity for such a paradigm shift. 
This leads to the broader question of exactly how ideas relate to power. It might be argued that 
discussions of power greatly downgrade the role of ideas in politics, making them little more than 
window dressing for political actors seeking their rational self-interest (Shapiro, 1999, pp. 28–38) or 
for dominant political structures (Gramsci, 1992, pp. 144–7). Ideational scholars have attempted to 
meet these challenges, arguing that we need to understand the interrelationship between power and 
ideas, rather than just dismissing the latter as subservient to the former (Carstensen and Schmidt, 
2015). In the context of discussions about austerity, these debates raise questions about how ideas 
are disseminated, and about the role played by powerful actors and institutions – especially in 
government and the media – in shaping public understanding. The greatest challenge for ideational 
research going forward is therefore to offer a theoretically grounded and empirically convincing 
synthesis of the role of ideas in political life. 
                                                          
1 Correspondence analysis can be interpreted in three or more dimensions, although this 
study does not attempt this. The levels of association achieved with two dimensions in this 
article are comparable to other studies (see, for example, Schonhardt-Bailey, 2005; 
Schonhardt-Bailey et al., 2012). 
2 As detailed in the methods sections, this study looks at explicit references to austerity, 
which raises the important question of whether the greater discussion of austerity on the left 
is indicative of the right employing an alternative euphemism. The results are somewhat 
ambiguous for some of the possible alternatives. Post-crisis deficit appears more on the left 
(14.6 times per 100k words) than the right (10.7 times). National debt is certainly used more 
by the right (2.26 times per 100k words post crisis) than the left (0.44 times). Insights into 
how these terms related to broader discussions of austerity are evident in the 
correspondence analysis carried out to address research question three.  
3 The correspondence analysis of left-leaning think tanks produced four axes. Axis 3 (19.9% of 
association) and axis 4 (13.3% of association) are not discussed in this article. 
4 Analysing some of these words is complicated by double meanings and the lemmatization 
process. While ‘protest’ is unambiguous, ‘march’/‘March’ appears in the dataset as both a 
verb and a month. ‘Demo’ can mean a protest, but it is also the lemma of demonstrate (as in 
‘to show’, democracy and Demos, the think tank). 
5 The correspondence analysis of right-leaning think tanks produced four axes. Axis 3 (20.8% 
of association) and axis 4 (17.5% of association) are not discussed in this article. 
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Table 1: Complete Dataset of UK think tank publications gathered for this study 
 
 
 
 
  
Political	
orientation
Left-leaning
Left	total	
Right-leaning
Right	total
Overall	total
Think	tank	name Number	of	publications	(number	of	'000	words	in	parenthesis)
Year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Compass 0 1 2 8 1 4 12 9 10 6 6
(0k) (8k) (44.47k) (205.64k) (31.17k) (88.73k) (182.59k) (82.37k) (188.21k) (33.69k) (42.16k)
Demos 15 28 23 29 21 21 28 24 36 39 30
(357.91k) (577.02k) (476.22k) (610.35k) (465.38k) (530.58k) (495.25k) (764.91k) (1087.29k) (1105.41k) (678.35k)
Fabians 4 3 5 4 7 4 6 8 5 18 17
(77.3k) (48.76k) (105.05k) (44.29k) (97.46k) (68.14k) (144.27k) (200.45k) (132.51k) (276.87k) (294.81k)
IPPR 28 33 36 54 41 30 49 65 67 63 70
(651.67k) (587.28k) (684.72k) (1111.10k) (620.93k) (696.31k) (843.37k) (707.97k) (965.02k) (1097.25k) (1307.31k)
Progress 0 0 0 0 0 10 3 0 3 3 3
(0k) (0k) (0k) (0k) (0k) (65.12k) (22.88k) (0k) (116.33k) (32.40k) (31.21k)
47 65 66 95 70 69 98 106 121 129 126
(1086.88k) (1221.06k) (1310.45k) (1971.36k) (1214.93k) (1448.94k) (1688.36k) (1755.69k) (2489.36k) (2545.61k) (2353.84k)
Bow	Group 2 4 5 4 1 3 4 6 16 6 3
(19.58k) (97.29k) (140.33k) (26.74k) (10.45k) (18.01k) (54.41k) (113.16k) (162.7k) (45.02k) (13.31k)
Centre	for	Policy	Studies 14 22 26 24 22 18 24 14 18 27 17
(207.66k) (309.08k) (228.16k) (223.12k) (176.34k) (145.2k) (257.28k) (173.79k) (177.31k) (253.28k) (153.08k)
Centre	for	Social	Justice 0 0 2 7 12 9 9 10 15 16 20
(0k) (0k) (62.49k) (355.87k) (264.61k) (349.54k) (625.73k) (190.29k) (425.56k) (236.07k) (562.49k)
Institute	of	Economic	Affairs 15 15 21 12 23 17 14 17 11 20 20
(250.21k) (509.52k) (524.79k) (267.66k) (888.72k) (582.68k) (543.56k) (331.07k) (256.63k) (386.27k) (407.51k)
Policy	Exchange 6 6 9 10 14 34 44 60 33 36 34
(177.76k) (143.74k) (202.53k) (266k) (339.4k) (811.57k) (955.35k) (1424.21k) (729.05k) (756.05k) (848.59k)
37 47 63 57 72 81 95 107 93 105 94
(655.21k) (1059.63k) (1158.3k) (1139.4k) (1679.53k) (1906.97k) (2436.32k) (2232.51k) (1751.28k) (1676.68k) (1984.98k)
84 112 129 152 142 150 193 213 214 234 220
(1742.09k) (2280.68k) (2468.75k) (3110.78k) (2894.46k) (3355.93k) (4124.68k) (3988.2k) (4240.64k) (4222.29k) (4338.82k)
Total
59
(907.04k)
294
(7148.67k)
81
(1489.90k)
536
(9272.31k)
22
(268k)
992
(19086.51k)
54
(700.99k)
226
(2304.3k)
100
(3072.65k)
185
(4948.61k)
286
(6654.26k)
851
(17680.82k)
1843
(36767.33k)
Table 2: Analytical Process Employed in this Study 
 
 
Stage Activity 
1  Develop research questions, based on existing literature 
 
2  Analysis using computer-assisted text analysis techniques to 
understand relationship between language and coded variables: 
 Corpus analysis; 
 Correspondence analysis. 
 
3 Interpret results of stage 2, develop possible explanations. 
 
4 Assess value of explanations developed in stage 2 
 Key-word-in-context tools (i.e. targetted manual reading). 
 
5 Develop and refresh research questions, based on stages 2-4. Return to 
stage 2 and repeat process.  
 
 
  
Figure 1: Overall number of mentions of austerity by left and right-leaning think tanks, 2003- 2013 
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Figure 2: Mentions of austerity per 100k words published by left and right-leaning think tanks, 2003-2013 
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Figure 3: Corpus analysis of right and left-leaning think tanks 2003–2013 
 
 
 
Note: Words ranked by their chi-square score and all have a p value = < 0.001.   
  
Figure 4: Correspondence Analysis of Left-Leaning Think Tanks 
 
 
Figure 5: Correspondence Analysis of Right-Leaning Think Tanks 
 
 
